Indonesia has long been the individualist of Asian geopolitics - a big country that behaved like a small one when all those around it were trying to do the opposite.
However, there is a sense that the world's largest Muslim state, and its fourth-largest by population, is slowly beginning to grow into its own skin. A Group of 20 member and arguably Southeast Asia's most functional democracy, Indonesia is starting to exude new political confidence. It is also growing in economic clout, with gross domestic product (GDP) expected to increase by over 6% this year and next year, and probably beyond.
A rising central budget includes bigger earmarks for the Indonesian armed forces, which have been starved of investment for decades and need to end their reliance on off-budget funding in
order to become truly professional and accountable. The anticipated 2011 defense budget, now up to US$6.3 billion, should rise incrementally over the coming years and - assuming the economy continues to grow - potentially soon overtake Singapore's to become Southeast Asia's largest.
Sukhoi IAFDefense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro has already mentally spent the extra money. He envisages 10 squadrons of Sukhoi fighter jets, new frigates and submarines, a modernized airlift capability, and a revamped domestic defense industry. In other words, he is preparing to reposition his country strategically as a more muscular power.
The prospect of a militarily more capable Indonesia has potentially disquieting implications for its Asia-Pacific neighbors. Over the years, Jakarta has come to epitomize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) way of non-aligned, non-interventionist neutrality. Ten-member ASEAN's do-nothing approach may frustrate outsiders on issues such as Myanmar, but in fact Indonesia's culture of political-military passivity, which permeates ASEAN, has been the bedrock of Southeast Asia's balmy security environment.
When Indonesia was militarily more aggressive in the 1950s and early 1960s, the region seemed far from benign, as those in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia still recall; but once Indonesia went quiet, so for the most part did Southeast Asia in terms of intra-regional conflict, apart from regional involvement in the US-Vietnam war. As the region's strategic tone-setter, to what extent might Indonesia's military rise upset the quiet balance in the Malacca Strait and beyond?
A more military-minded Indonesia clearly would reshape the region - and so the lack of complaint from neighboring countries in the wake of Purnomo's pronouncements on military investment demonstrates that none of them, yet, think that Indonesia has much chance of achieving its aims. "Indonesia's military-modernization plans are only realistic in the very long-term," says Tim Huxley, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore.
He likens Indonesia to South Korea, which took several decades to build a viable defense industry despite a large defense budget and consistent government policy-making. If Indonesia wants to emulate South Korea, Huxley says, then the transition will take between 20 or 30 years. "Indonesia is still at a relatively early stage," he says. "The stuffing has been knocked out of its defense industry."
Bernard Loo, an associate professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says that Indonesia's decision "to acquire more up-to-date military kit will almost surely begin to feed into their war-fighting capabilities". However, this need not have "any significant implication for regional security and stability, apart from generally positive ones”, he predicts.
Jakarta's ability to maintain defense-spending increases over the long term remains a "big if", Loo thinks. Its main priority - refocused by the recent tsunami and volcanic eruptions - is to address "the need to be able to project power into disaster-hit areas to bring immediate humanitarian relief". Tackling piracy is a second priority, which neighboring states would again embrace - just as they would welcome the increasingly stable Indonesian state that a properly equipped military would underpin.
Democratic might
KFX Jet Fighter MoU Indonesia - South KoreaIndonesia's newfound status as a respectable democratic partner should help it to restock its aging military inventory. A partnership with South Korea to co-develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft has already been unveiled. If Jakarta sees a strategic partnership with South Korea as the best route to achieving a capable defense industry, then an open tender for new submarines, for which Seoul is one of several bidders, might be expected to go the Koreans' way. “There's a lot of sense in South Korea and Indonesia going down the defense-industry route together,” says Huxley. "They are both medium powers with concerns about the changing strategic balance."
The US may also be willing to help Jakarta accelerate its military modernization efforts. US President Barack Obama is set to visit Indonesia next week not so much for a trip down memory lane (he once lived there) as for the strategic value the US sees in courting Jakarta. American hopes of retaining influence in Southeast Asia arguably rest with the likes of up-and-coming Indonesia, rather than with traditional allies such as Thailand and the Philippines.
Thailand's political turmoil and its improving relationship with China mean than the US can no longer depend on Bangkok as it once did; and though the new Benigno Aquino government in the Philippines has shown itself to be wary of Beijing's perceived bullying tactics in the South China Sea, there is a rising chorus for an end to the US military's basing rights there. By contrast, the region's rising economic stars, Indonesia and Vietnam, have both welcomed US strategic overtures, while also displaying wariness of Chinese advances.
Obama may now prepare the ground by offering mates' rates on the 10 C-130 transport aircraft that Jakarta seeks, with the prospect of more favorable deals to come. The sourcing of equipment is significant, Loo observes, because it will have an impact on Indonesia's ability to engage in cooperative security ventures with Malaysia and Singapore.
Loo regards Russia as a likely top source of Indonesia's future procurements, and it is already clear that Purnomo aims to buy Russian as he retools the air force's combat capability. Russian credit has funded the majority of recent military purchases in Indonesia. However, industry partnerships and technology transfer will become central to future Indonesian defense contracts, and any supplier willing to go along with that cooperation can expect a share of Jakarta's expanding budget.
The only threat to regional stability from Indonesia's military efforts, suggests Huxley, would come with a political shift away from democratization and back towards military-backed authoritarianism. This could feasibly see military spending increase at an even faster rate and the military assuming a more provocative stance towards neighboring states. There is no reason to foresee such a scenario, but Jakarta would do well to resume stalled military reforms in order to mitigate the possibility.
"Relationships within ASEAN have never been better," concludes Loo, who believes that Indonesia's military modernization will be good for Southeast Asia so long as it is "situated within the broader political framework of increasing security cooperation". There is certainly a clear sense both within Indonesia and across ASEAN that Indonesia requires a better equipped and better funded military than it currently possesses.
While there is no real regional suspicion regarding Indonesia's intentions, this could change as its modernization program gains traction. The challenge in Jakarta is to ensure that, as Indonesia assumes its natural role as the region's most powerful strategic actor, it simultaneously remains the anchor of ASEAN's stability.
From : ASIA TIMES
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